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Abstract
Just as in many other regions of the world, the European Union is prone to nearly all 
types of natural disasters such as earthquakes and floods. Moreover, due to climate 
change, both the number of incidents and the damage from natural disasters could 
increase. Natural disasters may cause significant economic losses, and consequently 
there is a strong demand for compensation for victims in their aftermath. We exam-
ine whether, from a theoretical perspective, there is any role to be played at the EU 
level in the compensation of victims of disasters, particularly in disaster insurance, 
and even if it were to be just a facilitative role, how this role could take shape in 
order to stimulate the insurability of natural disasters. We critically examine Euro-
pean initiatives with respect to disaster insurance and ex post compensation and for-
mulate lessons learned on the basis of the theoretical analysis. We explicitly address 
the question whether the role of the EU should be limited to facilitating insurability 
or whether it should include providing ex post compensation to states as well.
Keywords Climate change · Victim compensation · Disaster insurance · EU
Introduction
Unfortunately, just as in many other regions of the world, the European Union is 
prone to nearly all types of natural disasters. Not only do disasters cause human 
losses but also significant economic losses that affect economic stability and 
growth.1 Moreover, as a result of climate change, both the incidence of and the 
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damage from natural disasters such as flooding, heavy rain and hurricanes could 
even increase.2
The measures taken by the EU Member States with respect to the prevention of 
these natural disasters and also with respect to the compensation of victims of catas-
trophes differ widely in scope and form. Increasingly, one notices that the European 
Commission is becoming active in this domain. For example, in 2013 the Commis-
sion issued a Green Paper on natural and man-made  disasters1 and is actively exam-
ining the possibilities of insurance to provide cover for disaster risk. This leads to 
the question which we want to examine in this paper: whether there is any particular 
task at the European level with respect to compensation for victims of disasters. We 
basically distinguish between a role for the EU to facilitate insurability on the one 
hand, and the provision of ex post compensation to states on the other hand. The 
advantages and disadvantages of both options are critically discussed.
This article is structured as follows: first, we examine whether there is any par-
ticular task at the European level with respect to compensation for victims of disas-
ters on the basis of literature on the economics of federalism. It should be pointed 
out that in the literature the insurance against disasters is often discussed within the 
framework of adaptation to climate change. Thus we also ask the question whether 
Europe should have any particular competence as far as adaptation is concerned. Yet 
it should be clear that although the question of ex post compensation for victims of 
disasters is somewhat related to the question of adaptation, it is also different from 
it. Nevertheless, a lot of the literature, especially that related to federalism, largely 
focuses on the adaptation issue. We show that the problem is the following: although 
climate change and (some) disasters may have a transboundary character, the dam-
age is often local. Moreover, it is a domain where solutions adopted in the Member 
States differ greatly, and so preferences may strongly differ. The methodology we 
use to analyse the role of central government (in this case the EU) vis à vis subna-
tional entities, including the private sector, will benefit from the literature on the 
economics of federalism.
As stated above, the European Union is searching for a role with respect to the 
compensation of victims of natural disasters. Therefore, in the next section we focus 
on European initiatives to ensure compensation for victims of natural disasters that 
happen on the territory of the European Union. Here we examine European action 
with respect to disaster insurance. Disaster insurance allows risk to be transferred 
financially with a premium paid by the policyholder to the insurer, effectively allow-
ing those in at-risk areas to continue to live and work with low financial impact after 
a disaster. The question is, of course, whether the European Union would have any 
task in this respect. Second, the EU has created compensation mechanisms in order 
to demonstrate solidarity with victims of natural disasters. In particular circum-
stances the so-called solidarity fund (EUSF) pays the cost of emergency response, 
mostly aimed at the reconstruction of infrastructure. Moreover, on 26 June 2017 the 
Council adopted Regulation (EU) 2017/1199 to provide regions hit by earthquakes, 
2 European Environmental Agency (EEA), https ://www.eea.europ a.eu/highl ights /clima te-chang e-poses 
-incre asing ly-sever e, last accessed 14 September 2017.
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floods or other natural disasters with increased EU support, financed via the Euro-
pean fund for regional development (ERDF). The increased EU financing rate from 
the ERDF would complement the financial assistance that the EU already provides 
through its solidarity fund. However, funding solutions have been strongly criticised 
in the literature as not stimulating insurability. The question arises whether the same 
criticisms also apply here.
After analysing those EU initiatives that deal with natural disasters and floods 
in particular, we come back to our main question, notably whether from a theoreti-
cal perspective there is any role to be played at the EU level, especially in disas-
ter insurance. We thereby explicitly discuss advantages and disadvantages of two 
approaches: on the one hand, providing ex post compensation to states, and on the 
other hand, a more limited role whereby the EU would facilitate insurability. We 
argue that there is no strong justification for providing ex post compensation to 
states but that the EU may play a facilitative role, stimulating the insurability of 
disasters. In that respect, we focus on two particular aspects, the first being data 
exchange. A crucial element to stimulate the insurability of disasters is the avail-
ability of data. Data is largely available from market parties like reinsurers, but 
EU institutions such as the Joint Research Council are also actively involved in 
that domain. However, information exchange between (re)insurers has always been 
viewed with suspicion, given its potential anti-competitive character. For example, 
in the group exemption on insurance the information exchange between insurers 
was subject to very strict conditions; therefore, the question is how this informa-
tion exchange could be stimulated by European action while retaining a sufficiently 
competitive market. This is related to the second aspect we examine, that is, how 
the intervention of the government as reinsurer of last resort can be compatible 
with internal market rules, more particularly related to state aid. The final section 
concludes.
Is there a task for Europe with respect to disaster insurance? 
An economics of federalism perspective
The main aim of this paper is to explore whether there is a role for the EU in devel-
oping compensation mechanisms to cover disaster risks and, in particular, disaster 
insurance. Our central question is whether the EU should (as it currently does to 
some extent) provide ex post compensation to states or whether it should rather take 
on a more limited role in facilitating the insurability of disasters. The theoretical 
perspective to answer the question in this section is the economics of federalism. 
In this way, we focus our attention more particularly on the literature that analyses 
whether there should be any role for central institutions like the EU with respect to 
the adaptation to climate change. This literature can provide useful insights into our 
central question, as disaster insurance may be one of the instruments in a climate 
change adaptation policy.3
3 But climate change adaptation obviously involves more than disaster insurance, and disaster insurance 
is obviously not only limited to climate change related disasters. However, the theoretical literature with 
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A traditional environmental federalism perspective
Environmental federalism scholars traditionally start with a bottom-up approach 
towards centralisation using the Tiebout Model as the starting point of their analysis.
In 1956 Tiebout developed an ideal model of fiscal competition between inde-
pendent governments (Tiebout 1956, pp. 415–424; see also Inman and Rubinfeld 
2000, pp. 661–691). Tiebout stated that with decentralised, horizontally arranged, 
competitive governments, individuals could move along local jurisdictions to select 
the community with a regulatory combination that best satisfies their preferences for 
public goods. Governments would try to attract residents on the basis of differing 
tax and benefit structures (Tiebout 1956, pp. 415–424; see also Esty 1996, p. 608). 
Tiebout’s idea is now commonly known as ‘voting with the feet’ by citizens. Though 
the Tiebout model was designed for fiscal policies, academic scholars introduced 
the model to other fields of regulation. The Tiebout model became the starting point 
for scholars to state that public policies in various fields of regulation should be 
decentralised.
However, in certain circumstances some oversight at a higher governmental level 
might be appropriate. Starting from the Tiebout Model, there are four main argu-
ments for centralisation or harmonisation of regulation: the transboundary spillover 
argument, the race to the bottom argument, the market access argument and non-
economic arguments for centralisation or harmonisation.
First, the Tiebout Model, which favours decentralisation of the provision of pub-
lic goods, only holds if decisions of one jurisdiction have no external (negative) 
effects on other jurisdictions. When policies of a certain jurisdiction have a trans-
boundary effect on a neighbouring jurisdiction, there is an argument for centralisa-
tion. The reasoning is that jurisdictions will not take into account or ‘internalise’ the 
consequences of their actions that might accrue across their borders. Hence, juris-
dictions will have no incentive to impose stringent regulation on their own industry 
and consequently will underregulate the harmful activity (Faure 2003, pp. 38–39; 
see also Esty and Geradin 2001, p. 34).
A second argument for centralisation is the race to the bottom argument. The 
term ‘race to the bottom’ refers to an ongoing relaxation of state regulatory stand-
ards caused by interstate competition to attract industry. This relaxation of regula-
tory standards would result in a reduction of social welfare below the social welfare 
level that would exist in the absence of this race (Engel 1997, p. 274). If such a risk 
of destructive competition were to arise, then centralised standard setting might be 
advanced as a remedy to prevent states from engaging in this welfare-reducing race 
to the bottom.
Market access presents a third frequently advanced argument for the harmoni-
sation of environmental rules. It is sometimes argued that different levels in the 
stringency of safety regulations, such as environmental regulation, might cause 
Footnote 3 (continued)
respect to climate change adaptation can, as we show in this section, provide useful insights for analysing 
the role of the EU with respect to disaster insurance.
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trade distortions and hamper access to foreign markets (Esty and Geradin 1997, pp. 
266–269). The harmonisation of legal rules would create a level playing field and 
ease the various competitiveness concerns arising from the intersection of trade lib-
eralisation and safety regulations, such as environmental protection policies (Esty 
and Geradin 1997, pp. 265–266, see also 1998, pp. 5–46).
In sum, the traditional federalism theory starts from decentralisation, but certain 
market failures may necessitate oversight at a higher governmental level. Obviously, 
the question is how climate adaptation policy and disaster insurance fit within this 
framework.
Insights from democratic experimentalism and adaptive federalism
Democratic experimentalism is a theory of governance that is intended to encourage 
continuous improvement in the problem-solving capabilities of local governing units 
in a federal or decentralised system of government. According to the vision of two 
founding members, democratic experimentalism places policymaking authority on 
the local level. A central regulatory authority would exist, but significantly the role 
of that body would primarily be to support local government, feeding it informa-
tion regarding the performance of peer local governments and challenging it to do 
better. The composition of the central governing body would also differ from that 
of an atypical federal environmental agency, given that it would be populated by 
representatives from the private and non-profit making sectors (see Beaton 2008, pp. 
1700–1701; Dorf and Sabel 1998, pp. 316–318).
The concept of ‘adaptive federalism’ provides a theoretical framework for a 
dynamic model of environmental federalism that rejects the static ‘matching princi-
ple’.4 Adaptive federalism rejects the possibility of identifying a single optimal juris-
diction for regulation. Instead, under adaptive federalism and similar ecosystems 
the interactions of the different regulatory levels tend towards filling gaps and, over 
time, gradually optimising regulatory outcomes. Adaptive federalism recognises that 
environmental problems are multi-faceted. As stated by Adelman and Engel (2008, 
pp. 1796–1799), sources of environmental harm may be the manifestation of numer-
ous failures—market as well as regulatory—that arise along numerous dimensions 
and on widely different temporal and spatial scales. At the same time, the motivation 
to address environmental harm will originate from more than one level of govern-
ment, based upon a variety of social, economic and political variables. This diver-
sity, both in terms of the source of environmental problems and their solution, con-
tributes to policy experimentation on multiple scales and to innovative interactions 
between regulators on these various scales (Engel 2016, p. 9).
In terms of how it recommends allocating governing authority, democratic exper-
imentalism follows many of the same goals and exhibits many of the same features 
4 According to the ‘Matching Principle’, the choice of regulatory jurisdiction is dictated by the perceived 
geographical scope of the environmental problem in hand. Hence under this principle, localised environ-
mental problems are suitable only for local government regulation, whereas problems of international 
scope are suitable for agreement by nation states. See also Engel (2016, p. 7).
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as dynamic, adaptive federalism. Nevertheless, key differences that divide the two 
have important implications for environmental issues such as climate change adapta-
tion, and they lack an established governance scheme.
Scholars of democratic experimentalism tend to argue strongly for the location 
of policymaking authority primarily on the local or subnational level of govern-
ment rather than welcoming policy responses from all levels of government, includ-
ing central, national or federal government. Under democratic experimentalism the 
central authority, in contrast, has a role much like a benevolent parent to provide 
funding and oversee a peer review. By providing local and central authorities with 
distinct roles and functions, democratic experimentalism aligns more closely with 
the ‘matching principle’ (Engel 2016, pp. 13–14).
In contrast to democratic experimentalism, adaptive federalism rejects the idea of 
allocating exclusive regulatory authority to a given level of government with mini-
mal overlap with other jurisdictions in favour of overlapping regulation by regula-
tory authorities at multiple levels of government (Engel 2016, p. 15). On the one 
hand, dynamic and adaptive federalism values the state and local governments as the 
primary engines of the development of new policy prescriptions, while on the other 
hand, it is also considered fundamental that the central government should retain a 
‘full-service’ policymaking role. Only if it does so, can policy ideas truly pass back 
and forth vertically and, in a re-sizing process, change, adapt and be refined to better 
suit society’s needs. To preclude a role for the central government in policy innova-
tion may result in a bias towards the types of innovations developed. Larger jurisdic-
tions, for example, are more likely to be the source of certain policy innovations. A 
central government may be more likely to be the source of market-based policies, 
for example, because central government jurisdictions are more likely to encompass 
more numerous market participants and hence a more competitive market (Engel 
2016, p. 15).
The optimal decision‑making level for adaptation to a changing climate
As explained above, the traditional environmental federalism theory starts from 
decentralisation. Certain market failures, however, might justify intervention at a 
higher governmental level. The question that we now have to address is how the 
arguments of fiscal federalism presented above relate to the central question of our 
paper, that is, whether there should be any task for the EU as far as disaster insur-
ance is concerned. As already mentioned in the introduction, this question has not 
as such been explicitly addressed with respect to disaster insurance. However, there 
is some literature that has addressed whether the criteria of fiscal federalism could 
justify an EU intervention with respect to adaptation to climate change. As already 
mentioned, disaster insurance is a mechanism related to climate change adaptation, 
and in that respect it is interesting to address a few papers, more particularly studies 
by Engel and Farber, which have examined arguments for the centralisation of cli-
mate change adaptation in the U.S. To some extent, those arguments are interesting 
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for the EU level as well, although disaster insurance does of course have some spe-
cificities that distinguish it from adaptation policy in general.
The case for lodging adaptation with local and regional governing authorities is 
compelling. Climate change will impact upon human societies and ecosystems in 
vastly different ways, and much of the variation will be attributable to differences in 
the natural environment itself. Hence coastal areas will be forced to adapt to rising 
seas while dry, mountainous areas will need to address the ravages of drought and 
forest fires, and urban centres the dangers of excessive heat (Engel 2016, p. 18).
At the same time, however, commentators have pointed to the way in which adap-
tation policy presents many of the same issues that have in the past justified federal 
regulation: the existence of transboundary spillover effects, political distortions that 
hinder state response, or equity factors that call for fair treatment across local juris-
dictional lines (Farber 2009, p. 259; Glicksman 2009, p. 1159).
Both Farber and Glicksman hold that the same rationales that exist generally in 
favour of federal regulation apply with equal force with respect to adaptation. Inter-
state spillovers have long functioned as one of the strongest rationales for federal 
regulation. But this applies to adaptation as well. They provide the following exam-
ple: suppose one state refuses to take measures to absorb flood waters when flooding 
occurs on a water body shared with one or more downstream states. This failure 
may cause flooding in the downstream states. Similarly, when a state fails to imple-
ment water conservation measures with respect to a water body it shares with one or 
two other states, each of which has implemented water conservation measures, this 
freeriding behaviour may cause water shortage in other states. Similarly, the other 
rationales offered for federal regulation could easily exist with respect to adaptation. 
Take the race to the bottom rationale, whereby in the absence of federal minimum 
standards, states will engage in a welfare-reducing race to implement lax environ-
mental standards. This could plausibly occur, for instance, where states allow con-
struction in flood plain areas or in storm-prone sensitive coastal areas in an effort to 
attract economic development (Farber 2009, p. 269; Engel 2016, p. 19). However, 
one has to be careful with the conclusion that water shortage requires the centralisa-
tion of decision-making in all circumstances. Several empirical studies have shown 
that under specific conditions cooperation among riparian stakeholders may be facil-
itated. For example, in the U.S. the process of decentralisation has increased the role 
of subnational states in water resources management. Interactions among these sub-
national states has created the basis for collaboration in shared river basins.5
Much adaptation may come down to what the government—any government—
can afford to spend on it. Experts predict adaptation costs to be billions of dollars 
per year (see Wattkiss 2015). The federal government will have greater financial 
resources available. Imposing the funding obligation upon the federal government 
may be justified where states are unable to afford adaptation measures or where 
adaptation measures will affect multiple states (Farber 2009, p. 273; Engel 2016, p. 
19).
5 See Moore (2017, pp. 222–239) and other contributions in the special issue of Water International, 
Vol. 42(2), 2017.
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Given the disincentive to fund adaptation measures as well as the justification 
for local, state and regional involvement, it makes little sense to locate adaptation 
governance on one level of government. Instead, the dynamic federalism model 
would seem to fit adaptation, at least in terms of its embrace of regulation of mul-
tiple scales of government. In this model the federal, state and regional governing 
bodies represent alternative sources of policymaking. Dynamic federalism can be 
expected to promote synergy between government agencies. Given the lack of expe-
rience with adaptation policy, it would be foolish to rigidly cut off the source of new 
solutions from whatever level of government is motivated to act. The dynamic con-
cept of federalism addresses adaptation’s need for innovative policy from multiple 
scales of government (Engel 2016, p. 20).
It might be advantageous to look at other frameworks for more responsive policy-
making processes, such as democratic experimentalism, since experimentalism has 
a lot to offer for adaptation policy (Engel 2016, p. 21).
Commentators uniformly predict that climate change will bring with it dynamic, 
complex and potentially abrupt ecosystem changes on varying scales. Thus for 
some, regulations in the service of adaptation should seek to reduce the vulnerabil-
ity of the ecosystems to abrupt and uncertain change, and to reinforce the resilience 
of such systems. This process would seem ideally suited for democratic experimen-
talism—a problem in need of a regulatory system that constantly monitors its effects 
and updates its requirements. But for others the adaptation will necessitate national 
(and possibly international) infrastructure and regulations that—together with the 
necessary minimum standards to even out intra-state issues—will call for federal, 
state and local regulation similar to traditional federalism (Engel 2016, p. 1).
Summary
What are some of the lessons of this federalism literature for our central question 
related to the role of the EU in compensation for victims of disasters? The overview 
of literature presented in this section argues that the models of democratic experi-
mentalism and collaborative governance call for hybrid solutions of collaboration 
between central authorities and local authorities with a view to optimal decision-
making within a multi-level governance framework. The importance of a hybrid 
solution also applies to the domain of climate change adaptation. Specific adaptation 
measures can and should be taken at the local level, but a broader framework for 
structure adaptation can be (and has been) developed at a higher level of govern-
ance, more particularly at the EU level. This call of the literature for a hybrid solu-
tion would be an argument in favour of a facilitative role for the EU whereby the 
insurability of disasters in the different Member States would be facilitated, rather 
than a more active role where, for example, direct ex post compensation to states 
would be provided. Traditional arguments of the economics of federalism in favour 
of a strong competence at the central level (such as interstate spillovers or a race to 
the bottom) are not very convincing as a justification for an EU role in providing ex 
post compensation to states.
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Currently, the available insurance schemes for disaster risks vary widely in scope 
and form across Europe. This existing patchwork has arisen for historic and cultural 
reasons with different perceptions and customs when it comes to dealing with flood 
risks. Some follow the model that was introduced by France in 1982 that mandato-
rily adds disaster insurance to other voluntarily purchased insurances such as, for 
example, housing or fire insurance (for details see Cannarsa et al. 2006, pp. 86–88). 
The same model also exists in Belgium, Norway and Spain. In addition, the govern-
ment increasingly intervenes as a reinsurer of last resort to provide cover if reinsur-
ers lack capacity. The Netherlands, on the other hand, has always had a problematic 
history regarding flood insurance; for a long time flood insurance was prohibited as a 
result of a so-called binding agreement (basically a cartel between insurers agreeing 
not to provide flood coverage). After comments from the European anti-trust author-
ities this binding decision was transformed into a non-binding recommendation (see 
Faure 2007, pp. 347–348). But the practice did not fundamentally change. It is still 
extremely difficult to obtain flood insurance in the Netherlands.6 The large variety of 
instruments used to compensate disaster victims within the Member States is often 
the result of multiple and conflicting views as to what extent the public responses 
to flood risk should draw on principles of affordability, equity and solidarity. Local 
customs and traditions, as well as risk perception and attitudes also play an impor-
tant role in determining the extent of the underwriting of flood insurance products 
(Surminski et al. 2015, p. 1454). Those existing differences are, together with the 
absence of strong theoretical justifications, yet another argument against a strong 
role of the EU in compensating disaster victims.
European initiatives to compensate victims of natural disasters: 
disaster insurance versus compensation funds
After having sketched out the theoretical framework for assessing the role of the 
EU with respect to compensation after disasters in the literature review in the previ-
ous section, we now focus on the actual policy at the EU level. We first sketch the 
general adaptation strategy adopted by the EU as a background. Then we analyse to 
what extent the EU is currently involved in either of the two approaches central to 
our paper, those being to facilitate insurability or provide ex post compensation to 
states. Subsequently, we provide a critical analysis of both options.
EU adaptation strategy
At the  European level various steps have already been taken to adapt to climate 
change and to minimise the risk on, and the impact of, natural hazards. Adapta-
tion means anticipating the adverse effects of climate change and taking appro-
priate action to prevent or minimise the potential damage. It has been shown that 
6 For a more recent appraisal, see Bruggeman et  al. (2011) and Hartlief and Faure (2015, pp. 1030–
1035).
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well-planned, early adaptation action saves money and lives later on.7 Therefore, 
after an initial European adaptation framework was set out in a White Paper8 in 
2009, the European Commission introduced the EU Adaptation Strategy 2013. The 
strategy sets out a framework and mechanisms for preparing the EU for current and 
future climate impacts. The strategy has three main objectives: promoting action by 
Member States; promoting better informed decision-making and promoting adapta-
tion in key vulnerable sectors. With regard to flood risk, climate change must also be 
properly integrated into the implementation of the Floods Directive. Full implemen-
tation of this Directive by the EU Member States will help increase resilience and 
facilitate adaptation efforts.9
Facilitating insurability of disasters
After increasing losses from disasters, a debate about the role of the EU in shaping 
disaster insurance has emerged. A Green Paper on the insurance of natural and man-
made disasters, addressing the suitability of the insurance conditions in Europe due 
to the higher occurrence of extreme events accompanied the EU strategy on adapta-
tion to climate change. The Green Paper poses a number of questions concerning the 
adequacy and availability of appropriate disaster insurance. The objective is to raise 
awareness and to assess whether or not action at the EU level could be appropriate 
or warranted to improve the market for disaster insurance in the European Union.10
The Green  Paper1 is a first step towards encouraging insurers to improve the way 
they help to manage climate change risks. The Commission’s aim is to improve the 
market penetration of natural disaster insurance and to unleash the full potential of 
insurance pricing and other financial products for risk-awareness, prevention and 
mitigation, and for long-term resilience in investment and business decisions.11
The Green Paper reflects on the concerns about rising risk levels and how they 
can be accommodated through new and existing flood insurance schemes. Possible 
options include mandatory insurance, product bundling and public reinsurance or 
disaster pools. The consultation document frames insurance in two ways: the ques-
tion of availability and affordability, and the potential to use flood insurance as an 
instrument for flood prevention and flood damage mitigation.1
The crucial question for our paper is whether there is any particular task on the 
European level in this domain and how EU policy could help address the challenges 
9 European Commission, White Paper ‘Adapting to climate change: Towards a European framework for 
action’, Brussels, 1.4.2009 COM (2009) 147 final, 10.
10 European Environmental Agency, ‘Mapping the impacts of natural hazards and technological acci-
dents in Europe An overview of the last decade’, EEA technical report No 13/2010 Executive summary, 
11–12.
11 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Eco-
nomic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, ‘An EU Strategy on adaptation to cli-
mate change’, COM/2013/0216 final, Brussels, 16.4.2013, 9.
7 https ://ec.europ a.eu/clima /polic ies/adapt ation _en.
8 European Commission, factsheet adaptation 2014, p.1. https ://ec.europ a.eu/clima /sites /clima /files /docs/
facts heet_adapt ation _2014_en.pdf.
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at Member State level. On the basis of our theoretical framework some thoughts can 
be formulated on a potential task for the EU with respect to disaster insurance. Tak-
ing the strict criteria from fiscal federalism (the danger of transboundary externali-
ties and of a race to the bottom), it is not immediately clear why disaster insurance 
would specifically be a task for the EU. As mentioned earlier, damage resulting from 
natural disasters is often local, and the solutions worked out so far relating to dis-
aster insurance vary greatly between the EU Member States without so far having 
caused huge difficulties. The fact that France and Belgium, for example, have man-
datory comprehensive disaster cover, but the Netherlands and Germany do not, does 
not lead to any specific problem such as a transboundary externalisation of harm 
or a race to the bottom in particular Member States. Of course, it could be consid-
ered problematic that in some EU Member States (such as the Netherlands) disaster 
insurance is not sufficiently available, which may point to the concentrated nature of 
the particular insurance market. In that sense, rather than thinking about mandatory 
EU action in this domain, one could examine to what extent EU action might facili-
tate the availability of disaster insurance.
What is interesting is that the European Parliament uses the same reasoning in 
its report on the insurance of natural and man-made disasters.12 The European Par-
liament argues that prevention is the most important factor in terms of protecting 
people and avoiding losses caused by unexpected events. The European Parliament 
therefore sees a role for the EU in developing a more responsible society which 
gives enough thought to preventive measures and creating a culture of prevention, 
enhancing citizens’ awareness of both natural and man-made risks.13
Therefore, the European Parliament welcomes the Commission’s efforts to raise 
awareness regarding disasters, but underlines that ‘the EU should not create over-
lapping and contradictory liability rules’. The European Parliament further points 
out that ‘in most Member States there is some form of insurance-based system for 
floods and other natural damage. The system can be supplemented with state funds 
to compensate for those assets which cannot be privately insured, and state funds 
may also compensate for insurance claims exceeding the maximum amounts or for 
otherwise exceptionally heavy damage’. The European Parliament further takes the 
view ‘that a Member State may participate in compensation for damage by provid-
ing reinsurance but these systems differ in many respects, and it is not prudent or 
necessary to unify them’.14
It is also interesting that the European Parliament points to the risk of moral haz-
ard if citizens assume that their government will be using public resources from the 
national budget to cover their losses. The European Parliament is therefore critical 
of actions and measures which may discourage citizens or communities from taking 
12 European Parliament, Report on the insurance of natural and man-made disasters (2013/2174(INI)), 
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, A7-0005/2014, 20.12.2013.
13 European Parliament, Report on the insurance of natural and man-made disasters (2013/2174(INI)), 
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, A7-0005/2014, 20.12.2013, 4/7.
14 European Parliament, Report on the insurance of natural and man-made disasters (2013/2174(INI)), 
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, A7-0005/2014, 20.12.2013, 5/7.
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measures to protect themselves. Therefore, the European Parliament is of the opin-
ion that citizens should carry their share of responsibility and that compensation 
should not cover all damage.15
The European Parliament also concludes that there is no market distortion in this 
field to justify intervention at the European level, and therefore the European Parlia-
ment does not think that a one-size-fits-all solution would be appropriate, and fur-
ther points out that tailor-made insurance products depend on many elements such 
as type of risks, their probable quantity and quality, culture of prevention, state of 
preparedness and capacity for action and the approach taken by Member States and 
regional authorities concerning risk monitoring and preparation.15
As such, the European Parliament considers that a flexible natural catastrophe 
insurance market allows insurance companies to adapt products to different condi-
tions, and believes that a non-mandatory framework is the best way to develop prod-
ucts that match natural risks in a given geographical area. So far, no further steps 
have been taken by the EU Commission.
In sum, at the policy level there does not seem to be support for further centrali-
sation (or harmonisation) of disaster insurance within the EU.
Ex post compensation
Natural disasters may cause significant economic losses, and consequently there is 
a strong demand for compensation for victims in the aftermath of a disaster. Also at 
the European level, funds have been created to fulfil the need to show solidarity with 
victims.
The European Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF)16 was set up in 2002 to respond 
to major natural disasters and to express European solidarity to disaster-stricken 
regions within Europe. The EUSF was established following devastating flooding in 
Central Europe in the summer of that year.
Furthermore, regulation (EU) 2017/1199, adopted on 26 June 2017, provides for 
the EU to meet up to 95% of the reconstruction costs of regions affected by earth-
quakes, floods or other natural disasters. The regulation is the result of a proposal by 
the EU Commission in the wake of the earthquakes that struck central Italy in 2016.
Funding solutions have been strongly criticised in the literature as not stimulat-
ing insurability. However, the question arises whether, given the particular shape of 
these funds, the same criticisms also apply there.
We first provide a brief summary of the functioning of the European solidarity 
fund and Regulation (EU) 2017/1199, followed by an economic analysis.
16 Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 of 11 November 2002 establishing the European Union Soli-
darity Fund, OJ L 311 of 14.11.2002, hereafter EUSF Council Regulation.
15 European Parliament, Report on the insurance of natural and man-made disasters (2013/2174(INI)), 
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, A7-0005/2014, 20.12.2013, 6/7.
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The European Union Solidarity Fund
The European Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF) was set up to respond to major natural 
disasters and express European solidarity with disaster-stricken regions in Europe. 
The EUSF was established in 2002 following devastating flooding in Central Europe 
in the summer of that year. Since then, this fund has been used for 76 disasters cov-
ering a range of different catastrophic events including floods, forest fires, earth-
quakes, storms and drought. Twenty-four different European countries have been 
supported so far to an amount of over EUR 5 billion.17
The main purpose of the EUSF is the provision of assistance to Member States 
or accession countries whose regions are affected by major natural disasters such as 
floods, fires, storms, drought and earthquakes with serious effects on the living con-
ditions of the citizens of the affected regions, as well as the economic welfare or the 
natural environment.18
A disaster is considered to be major if the direct damage caused amounts to at 
least EUR 3 billion19 or exceeds 0,6% of the gross national income (GNI) of the 
affected state.20 The EUSF can also intervene for regional national disasters that 
affect the majority of the population of a region if it is deemed that the disaster 
will have serious and lasting effects on the economic stability and living conditions 
of that region. Furthermore, pursuant to the neighbouring country criterion, those 
member states or accession states suffering from the impact of the same disaster as 
another state for which the status of major disaster has already been declared may 
also receive assistance.21
Assistance from the EUSF takes the form of a grant to supplement public spend-
ing by the beneficiary state and is intended to finance measures to alleviate non-
insurable damage.22 Measures eligible for funding are: restoring infrastructure and 
plants that provide energy, drinking water, waste and water disposal, telecommu-
nications, transport, healthcare and education; the provision of temporary accom-
modation and the funding of rescue services in order to meet the needs of the 
population affected; the immediate consolidation of preventive infrastructure and 
protection of cultural heritage sites; and the cleaning-up of disaster-stricken areas, 
including natural zones.23 Solidarity Fund grants are financed outside the normal 
EU budget.
17 http://ec.europ a.eu/regio nal_polic y/en/fundi ng/solid arity -fund/ last accessed 7 September 2017.
18 European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies Policy Department D: Budgetary 
Affairs. Success Stories: The Use of the EU Solidarity Fund, in-depth Analyses, PE 490.699, 26/11/2014 
and EUSF Council Regulation, Article 2.
19 At 2011 prices.
20 EUSF Council Regulation, Article 2 (2).
21 EUSF Council Regulation, Article 2. In Article 2 (2), a region is further defined as a region at NUTS 
level 2.
22 EUSF Council Regulation, Article 3 (3).
23 EUSF Council Regulation, Article 3.
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The Regulation did foresee that the Council should review the Regulation on the 
basis of a proposal from the Commission by 31 December 2006.24
Indeed, since its creation it has become clear that changes are needed to live up to 
the expectations of disaster-stricken countries and regions waiting for EU aid. While 
the instrument was generally meeting its objectives well, it was considered to be 
insufficiently responsive, as certain criteria for its activation are too complicated or 
not sufficiently clear. Moreover, the procedure for granting assistance is lengthy, and 
it usually takes around one year from the disaster to the payment of the grant.25
In 2005 the Commission presented a legislative proposal for a new EU Solidar-
ity Fund Regulation.26 Building on the existing fund, this proposal aimed for (1) 
enlarged scope and wider eligibility of operations to enable the Community to react 
to disasters other than those of natural origin, e.g., industrial accidents and other 
man-made disasters, threats to public health (such as pandemics) and major terrorist 
acts; (2) the possibility to make advance payments to accelerate the rate of response 
and the visibility of EU support; and (3) simplification through the introduction of 
clearer criteria for the activation of the Fund.27
The proposal was very favourably received by the European Parliament, which 
adopted the proposal at its first reading on 18 May 2006.
However, in the Council the proposal met with widespread scepticism and oppo-
sition among a vast majority of Member States concerning almost all new ele-
ments and, in particular, in the light of their potential implications for the budget. 
To unblock the situation, the Commission proposed, in its communication on the 
Future of the European Union Solidarity Fund of 6 October 2011, ways to improve 
the functioning of the fund, but this did not lead to a reboot of the debate.
On 25 July 2013 the Commission presented a new legislative proposal to make 
the Solidarity Fund faster, clearer and simpler to use. The proposal included the 
following modifications: speeding-up of payments; the introduction of possible 
advance payments, a clearer definition of the scope for intervention through the 
Solidarity Fund, and a simplification of the administrative procedures by combining 
decisions on the awarding of grants with the implementation agreement. The pro-
posal, negotiated under the ordinary legislative procedure, led to the entry into force 
of the amending Regulation (EU) No 661/2014 of 15 May 2014.28
Furthermore, the reform encourages Member States to put disaster prevention and 
risk management strategies higher on the agenda. Article 8 (3) obliges beneficiary 
26 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the European 
Union Solidarity Fund, COM (2005) 108 final of 6.4.2005.
27 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Coun-
cil, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, The Future of the 
European Union Solidarity Fund, Brussels, 6.10.2011 COM(2011) 613 final, 7.
28 Regulation (EU) No 661/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15  May 2014 
amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 establishing the European Union Solidarity Fund, OJ 
L189/143, 27.6.2014.
24 EUSF Council Regulation, Article 14.
25 European Commission, Press Release, Making the EU Solidarity Fund faster and simpler for support 
after disasters, Brussels, 25 July 2013; European Commission, Memo, Q&A on the reform of the Euro-
pean Union Solidarity Fund, Brussels, 23 July 2013, IP/13/732.
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states to present an implementation report in which they describe preventive meas-
ures to limit future damage.29 As such, the European Commission has taken clear 
steps to link the Fund to pro-active risk reduction.
Regulation (EU) 2017/1199 of 26 June 2017
In 2016, earthquakes struck four regions in Central Italy and had a devastating effect 
on the people living in the area as well as all the capital assets.30 Large-scale recon-
struction work was required, notably to restore the cultural heritage of the affected 
areas. In the wake of the earthquakes, Commission President  Juncker  announced 
that the EU would stand by Italy and its citizens and help fully reconstruct the areas 
damaged, including the Basilica of San Benedetto in Norcia.31
On 30 November 2016 the Commission produced a specific follow-up to its 
commitment and published a proposal for a targeted amendment to the 2014–2020 
Cohesion Policy regulation.32
The Commission argued that Europe needed to be able to provide prompt addi-
tional, effective support from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) 
to Member States and regions hit by major or regional natural disasters, comple-
menting the means available under the European Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF). 
In order to provide such additional assistance to Member States affected by natural 
disasters, the Commission proposed to introduce the possibility of a separate prior-
ity axis for reconstruction operations supported by the ERDF within an operational 
programme.33
Moreover, given the potential magnitude of the impact of natural disasters, it was 
proposed to provide the possibility to finance reconstruction work by the ERDF with 
a co-financing rate of up to 100%, hence without the need for national co-financ-
ing, on condition that the operations to be financed within this separate priority axis 
should be those linked to reconstruction in response to major or regional natural dis-
asters as defined in Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 establishing the Euro-
pean Union Solidarity Fund.16,34 Normally, the ERDF co-finances projects alongside 
29 Regulation (EU) No 661/2014, Article 8.
30 The earthquakes happened on 24 August 2016 and on 27 October 2016.
31 http://europ a.eu/rapid /press -relea se_IP-16-4095_en.htm, last accessed 5-9-2017.
32 Regulation (EC) 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 lay-
ing down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, 
the Cohesion Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development, and the European Mari-
time and Fisheries Fund and laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development 
Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and 
repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006, OJ L 347, 20.12.2013..
33 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council, amending Regulation (EU) 
No 1303/2013 as regards specific measures to provide additional assistance to Member States affected by 
natural disasters, Brussels, 30.11.2016 COM (2016) 778 final, Explanatory Memorandum. See also Reg-
ulation (EU) No 1301/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on the 
European Regional Development Fund and on specific provisions concerning the investment for growth 
and jobs goal and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1080/2006, OJ L 347, 20.12.2013.
34 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council, amending Regulation (EU) 
No 1303/2013 as regards specific measures to provide additional assistance to Member States affected by 
natural disasters, Brussels, 30.11.2016 COM (2016) 778 final, Explanatory Memorandum.
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national funding, with the proportion of ERDF and national funding varying accord-
ing to the wealth of a particular region.35
In its proposal the Commission argued that in order to provide additional assis-
tance to Member States affected by natural disasters an amendment of Regulation 
(EU) No 1303/2013 was required. The Commission further argued that the proposal 
was a limited and targeted change not going beyond what is necessary to achieve the 
objective of providing additional assistance to Member States affected by natural 
disasters.36 Moreover, the amendment remained within the limits of the overall allo-
cation for the period 2014–2020 and was therefore budget neutral. The increased co-
financing rate up to 100% would lead to a partial front-loading of payments followed 
by lower payments at a later stage, as the overall envelope is unchanged.36
If the proposal were to be adopted, any Member State affected by a natural dis-
aster (as qualified under Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 on EUSF) would 
be able to activate this form of EU support. Moreover, Member States struck by 
earthquakes, floods or severe droughts and forest fires could activate this special EU 
support from day one of a disaster and for disasters that have occurred since the 
beginning of the current programme period, i.e., 1 January 2014.37 It would supple-
ment the EU Solidarity Fund assistance and spare national resources. Moreover, it 
would provide quick and efficient EU assistance to regions in distress.38
On 26 June 2017, Regulation (EU) 2017/1199 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 4 July 2017 amending Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 regarding spe-
cific measures to provide additional assistance to Member States affected by natural 
disasters was adopted.39 In Article 120 of Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 the fol-
lowing paragraph was added: “a separate priority axis with a co-financing rate of up 
to 95% may be established within an operational programme to support operations 
which fulfil all of the following conditions; the operations are selected by managing 
authorities in response to major or regional natural disasters as defined in Article 
2(2) and (3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002; the operations are aimed at 
reconstruction in response to the natural disaster; and the operations are supported 
under an ERDF investment priority”.
It is remarkable that the EU will in the future bear up to 95% of the costs instead 
of the proposed 100%. The U.K. parliament considered the proposal on 19 April 
2017 and argued that ‘the UK and other Member States have asserted the impor-
tance of the principle of national co-financing. In our scrutiny we have expressed 
sympathy with the Commission’s approach but we agree too that co-financing is an 
36 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council, amending Regulation (EU) 
No 1303/2013 as regards specific measures to provide additional assistance to Member States affected by 
natural disasters, Brussels, 30.11.2016 COM(2016) 778 final, p.3.
37 http://europ a.eu/rapid /press -relea se_IP-16-4095_en.htm, Brussels, 30 November 2016.
38 http://www.agrip ressw orld.com/start /artik el/59153 7/en.
39 Regulation (EU) 2017/1199 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2017 amending 
Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 as regards specific measures to provide additional assistance to Member 
States affected by natural disasters, OJ L176/1, 7.7.2017.
35 https ://publi catio ns.parli ament .uk/pa/cm201 617/cmsel ect/cmeul eg/71-xxxvi /7107.htm.
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important principle for EU structural funding, and there is a risk that this new pro-
posal—however well intended—could start to erode the principle’.40
Nevertheless, for some regions the co-financing rate of 95% almost doubles the 
EU’s financial contribution from the current level of 50%. Indeed, without changing 
the volume of national European Regional Development Fund envelopes, it means 
that a disaster-stricken region with a Cohesion Policy programme that foresees a 
50% co-financing rate, as, for example, most French and German regions, could 
receive almost double the funding from the EU to finance reconstruction work. 
Programmes with an 85% EU co-financing rate, such as the Portuguese region of 
Madeira, could get an exceptional top-up that would spare public resources in dif-
ficult times.41
It is interesting that the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) is of 
the opinion that it is quite appropriate to use the European Regional Development 
Fund (ERDF) to complement the EUSF in the event of major disasters, as the two 
funds share the same ethical principles and certain programmatic criteria for action. 
Furthermore, the EESC holds that both funds provide further evidence of European 
solidarity, and the operations that they generally finance work towards the same 
goals of promoting economic growth and balanced and sustainable development in 
Europe’s regions. The EESC goes even further and argues that the regulation is only 
applicable to major natural disasters and does not stand in for Member States in the 
event of disasters where the resulting damage is assessed to be below the amount 
that the EESC considers to be an excessively high threshold in need of revision. On 
the other hand, the EESC is also concerned about the rise in the number of disasters, 
both natural and otherwise, and stresses the need to step up prevention policies. The 
EESC considers that the European institutions and Member States place insufficient 
emphasis on prevention.42
To sum up, Regulation (EU) 2017/1199 is potentially quite far-reaching, and 
hence a critical economic analysis would be appropriate.
Analysis
After having sketched out the actions of the EU so far with respect to the compensa-
tion of disasters in the previous section we now analyse the two options (facilitat-
ing insurability versus providing ex post compensation) inter alia in the light of the 
theoretical framework provided in the section “Is there a task for Europe?” but also 
40 https ://publi catio ns.parli ament .uk/pa/cm201 617/cmsel ect/cmeul eg/71-xxxvi /7107.htm, last accessed 
14 September 2017.
41 http://ec.europ a.eu/regio nal_polic y/en/newsr oom/news/2017/07/27-07-2017-speci al-eu-suppo rt-in-
case-of-natur al-disas ters-enter s-into-force -today .
42 Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 as regards specific 
measures to provide additional assistance to Member States affected by natural disasters’, OJ C 173/38, 
31.5.2017.
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based on other literature. We first address further possibilities to stimulate insurabil-
ity and then address the ex post compensation to states.
Stimulating insurability through EU action
The benefits of insurance solutions for disasters have been well documented in the 
literature. Insurance can boost resilience to natural hazards (see inter alia Faure 
and Heldt 2017). Insurance can reduce financial burdens and uncertainty and assist 
economies in dealing with the negative long-term impacts of natural hazards such as 
flooding (Surminski et al. 2015, p. 1453). Risk pricing may encourage the reduction 
of exposure and lead to lower damage costs (Kunreuther 1996). The major advan-
tage of an insurance solution (especially when compared to solidarity payments) is 
that it can promote disaster risk reduction and thus provide a positive incentive for 
taking preventive measures. The question therefore arises whether specific actions 
could be undertaken on the EU level to stimulate the insurability of disasters. Two 
examples will be provided without working them out in full detail.
Information exchange
One first important aspect in the supply of disaster insurance is obviously that insur-
ers need to have adequate information on the probability that particular disasters 
may occur. Predictability of the risk is a key element to guarantee insurability (see 
Faure and Hartlief 2003, pp. 81–87).
As mentioned in the introduction, the EU could to some extent provide informa-
tion on the probabilities of disasters to insurers, for example via its joint research 
centre (JRC), and this information could subsequently be used to provide offers to 
the market. However, another possibility for insurers would be to collaborate on data 
exchange, which has always been a very touchy subject with competition authori-
ties, because they feared that information exchange, more particularly on data, could 
endanger competition in insurance markets (see Faure and Van den Bergh 1995). 
The EU competition authorities accommodated the concerns of insurers by grant-
ing two block exemption regulations in 1992 and 2003. Block exemptions protect 
particular agreements (in this case between insurers) from the application of com-
petition law if the requirements set in the regulations concerning the block exemp-
tion are met. These block exemptions were also applicable inter alia to the estab-
lishment of a common risk premium by granting two block exemption regulations 
in 1992 and 2003. Those were applicable to four types of agreements and granted 
exemptions from competition law under certain conditions. The block exemption 
regulations applied to: (a) the establishment of common risk premium tariffs, based 
on collectively ascertained statistics or on the number of claims; (b) the establish-
ment of standard policy conditions; (c) the common coverage of certain types of 
risks; and (d) the establishment of common rules on the testing and acceptance of 
security devices. This therefore allowed insurers to collaborate and exchange infor-
mation on statistics. In 2010, following a consultation and evaluation process, the 
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Commission decided to renew the block exemption. However, the renewal applied 
only to two of the four types of agreements that had been covered by the previous 
block exemptions: (a) joint compilations, tables and studies; and (b) co-insurance 
and reinsurance pools. In addition, the EU Commission made it clear more recently 
that it might completely repeal the block exemptions in the domain of insurance. 
On 31 March 2017 the insurance block exemption regulation expired and it has not 
been renewed.43 The fact that the EU insurance block exemption regulation has not 
been renewed implies that from 1 April 2017 insurers themselves must check their 
compliance with competition law. This raises the question of whether insurers still 
have the possibility to collaborate, for example as far as data exchange and statistics 
are concerned, without running the risk of getting into difficulties with the competi-
tion authorities. If that were the case, the alternative could be a more prominent role 
of the JRC in providing basic data enabling the insurability of disasters. Here one 
notices the difficult trade-off between the need for insurers to be able to rely on sta-
tistics and data on the one hand in order to make catastrophic risks insurable, and on 
the other hand, the justified desire of competition authorities to apply competition 
law.
The government as the reinsurer of last resort
The supply of catastrophe insurance has another feature which may endanger the 
insurability, i.e., the fact that the magnitude of disasters can often be so large as to 
make it impossible even for the traditional reinsurance market to cover the risk. In 
order to deal with this problem, an interesting model has been developed that comes 
down to the government acting as reinsurer of last resort, with the state assuming at 
least part of the risk for losses from catastrophes. It has been argued in the literature 
that, provided particular conditions are met, such reinsurance by the government can 
indeed positively stimulate the insurability of catastrophes (see Bruggeman et  al. 
2010, pp. 369–390). This intervention by the government is far preferable to solidar-
ity payments as it is a way to stimulate the functioning of the insurance market. In 
this respect, the question also arises whether the EU could play a facilitative role. 
A first role to consider would be to have the EU institutions themselves fulfil this 
role as reinsurer of last resort. However, given the framework of fiscal federalism 
developed in the previous section, one does wonder why this task should necessarily 
be taken on by EU institutions rather than by the governments of Member States. 
There may, however, be another role for the EU. Whenever the government inter-
venes as reinsurer of last resort this could again be scrutinised by EU (competition) 
authorities, more particularly since this support could be considered as a prohibited 
form of state aid. Looking back, one can see that in particular cases the state aid 
procedure was followed, whereby Member States’ authorities argued that it was an 
intervention which was not distortive, precisely because it supported the functioning 
43 European Commission Press Releases Anti-trust: Commission publishes report on functioning of 
insurance block exemption regulation, 17 March 2016, available at: http://europ a.eu/rapid /press -relea 
se_IP-16-861_en.htm.
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of the insurance market. This problem arose inter alia when the Dutch government 
decided to intervene in the creation of a pool for damage to agricultural property 
in the Netherlands as a result of heavy rainfall. A second layer was provided by the 
Dutch government as reinsurer of last resort, which was reported to the European 
Commission within the framework of the state aid procedure and which was granted 
authorisation by the European Commission (for details see Bruggeman et al. 2012, 
pp. 185–241).
This example again shows that in particular circumstances an intervention by 
government—more particularly as reinsurer of last resort—may be desirable to stim-
ulate the functioning of the insurance market. It may be important precisely because 
it could allow the functioning of the insurance market and avoid distortive solidar-
ity payments. In that respect, it may be important that the EU authorities (as in the 
Dutch example) realise that such an intervention can stimulate rather than distort the 
insurance market and therefore facilitate those particular solutions.
Ex post compensation
Criticism in law and economics literature
There has generally been strong criticism formulated in the law and economics lit-
erature with respect to ex post compensation by governments, either via a structural 
compensation fund (such as the EUSF) or via ad hoc solidarity payments. There are 
generally three problems identified in the literature.
A first major disadvantage of the lump sum payment in government relief is that 
no incentives are provided to potential victims to take effective preventive measures. 
Since the payments under government relief do not usually relate to risk, they offer 
no incentives for taking preventive measures. Of course it will very much depend 
upon the nature of the disaster whether it is realistic that victims could have taken 
preventive measures. Preventive measures that need great infrastructural ex ante dis-
aster management will, for the public good reason discussed above, primarily be 
undertaken by government. Taking structural measures (e.g., to protect a country 
against tsunamis or against a terrorism risk) will primarily be a government task. 
However, there are certainly measures that individual potential victims can take, not 
so much to prevent a (natural) disaster, but rather to limit the impact and damage. 
As far as flood protection is concerned, for example, an important factor relates to 
the location decision. Damage could obviously be prevented by not living in flood-
prone areas. But again the government may be the best situated to know where these 
flood-prone areas are and could therefore, by means of zoning and refusal of build-
ing permits, prevent relocation to those types of areas. However, even when exposed 
to particular risks, victims can to some extent take preventive measures (e.g., in the 
case of flooding by not keeping the most valuable objects in the cellar or on the 
ground floor). These measures may be relatively limited compared to the impact of 
infrastructural work that a government could undertake, but they remain important. 
The problem is that ex post recovery by government may not provide incentives to 
take those appropriate preventive measures (for further examples see Bruggeman 
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et al. 2011). In that respect, the literature argues that competitive insurance markets 
are better able to deal with moral hazard and adverse selection via risk differentia-
tion (Priest 1996).
A second problem is that victims may be counting on government compensation, 
which may therefore create an incentive not to purchase insurance (Levmore and 
Logue 2003, p. 281; Kaplow 1991). The problem of government-provided compen-
sation is indeed that it may dilute incentives to purchase insurance, since victims 
could simply freeride on the state (Gron and Sykes 2002, 2003; Endres et al. 2003, 
p. 290). In the words of Gollier: ‘Solidarity kills market insurance’ (Gollier 2005, 
p. 25). Coate has identified a lack of insurance resulting from the generosity of the 
government (Coate 1995). The problem has been referred to as the ‘charity hazard’ 
(more particularly by Raschky and Weck-Hannemann 2007). Also, an experimental 
study on crop insurance in the Netherlands showed that the willingness of producers 
to purchase private insurance (supported by government) had a significant negative 
influence on the producer’s belief in the availability of disaster relief in the future.44 
The study concludes that if governments continue to provide free ad hoc disaster 
relief, an important incentive to participate in crop insurance programmes would 
be severely undermined.45 Recently, a similar conclusion was also reached based 
on empirical research comparing compensation mechanisms available in different 
countries after the August flood of 2005 in Austria, Switzerland and the German 
state of Bavaria (see Raschky et al. 2009). The study argues that there was a sub-
stantial charity hazard leading to a lower purchase of insurance in Austria, where 
there was a disaster fund that pays (low) amounts of compensation. Participation in 
flood insurance was higher in Bavaria, although it was highest in the Swiss canton of 
Grisons, which had a public monopoly insurance with mandatory participation (see 
Raschky et al. 2009).
A related problem is that there may be negative distributional effects, since some 
victims (who probably purchased houses at low prices in flood-prone areas) may fre-
eride on other individuals (the general tax payers) who finance the ex post recovery.
Application of the case of the EU
There are, however, some reasons to rethink this criticism. A first important rea-
son is that the payments from the EUSF and the ERDF, as was made clear in the 
description above, are not paid directly to victims of disasters but rather to govern-
ments. The question therefore arises whether the same type of moral hazard that 
may occur with victims of disasters could also play a role with the EUSF. A second 
issue is that the payments from the EUSF are not so much geared towards ex post 
compensation of victims (usually qualified as recovery) but more towards immediate 
relief. The same seems to be the case for the newly established European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF); in fact, it only complements (although very generously) 
44 With respect to a crop insurance programme in the Netherlands see Van Asseldonk et al. (2002).
45 Ibid.
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the means available under the EUSF and provides additional assistance directly to 
Member States but not to victims.
In the literature it has been argued that much of the criticism with respect to ex 
post intervention by the government in cases of (natural) disasters mostly applies 
to recovery. Recovery is an ex post intervention needed to return the social welfare 
trajectory to where it would have been had the disaster never occurred (Leonard and 
Howitt 2010). Recovery consists of two kinds of efforts: reconstruction activities 
and victim compensation. Reconstruction activities are typically aimed at restoring 
public services and the country’s infrastructure such as roads, harbours and rail-
ways. Compensation is usually intended to compensate victims for property losses. 
Recovery is distinguished from relief. Relief efforts consist of executing an effective, 
damage-limiting response immediately after an event. For example, in the immedi-
ate aftermath of a hurricane people may need basic temporary shelter; then they may 
need transitional housing while they find a new place to settle or while their former 
homes are cleaned up, repaired and/or rebuilt; and they may need help with these 
processes (Sugarman 2007, p. 32). The literature has indicated that the moral hazard 
which arises in case of ex post actions by the government may play a role in the case 
of recovery but less of a role in the case of relief. The general point is that interven-
tion that is too generous ex post will affect incentives for prevention ex ante—to 
the extent that the victims’ expectation of political intervention recovery reduces the 
incentive to take precautions. The situation is different, however, with respect to the 
effects of relief on prevention. Relief interventions are quick and tailored to the situ-
ation. Moral hazard is less of a problem for relief activities, as relief does not pro-
vide full compensation but merely mitigates further damage (see Dari-Mattiacci and 
Faure 2015, p. 199).
At first sight, the EUSF seems to focus strongly on relief efforts. The Council 
Regulation 2012/2002 of 11 November 2002 that established the European Union 
Solidarity Fund discussed above makes it clear inter alia in its Article 3 that the 
essential aim of the EUSF is “to help the beneficiary state to carry out the following 
essential emergency operations, depending on the type of disaster”. The examples 
that follow clearly focus on what would usually be considered to be relief efforts, 
such as (a) the immediate restoration to working order of infrastructure, (b) the pro-
vision of temporary accommodation and funding for rescue services to meet the 
immediate needs of the population concerned, (c) the immediate securing of preven-
tive infrastructures, and (d) the immediate cleaning up of disaster-stricken areas.
Now that the EUSF focuses more strongly on relief rather than on recovery it 
would seem at first that the payments by the EUSF do not necessarily negatively 
affect incentives as is the case with recovery. However, this (positive) conclusion 
may have been reached too soon. The conclusion in the literature that relief efforts 
do not generally affect ex ante preventive efforts may be correct as far as the poten-
tial victims exposed to natural disasters are concerned; the situation may, how-
ever, be different with respect to the governments that are the beneficiaries of the 
EUSF. In this respect, we should point to some important research by Depoorter, 
who indicated that incentives for investment in disaster prevention by politicians are 
often distorted and, as a result, politicians will often oversupply ex post recovery 
and underinvest in prevention (Depoorter 2006). The general problem is that the 
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likelihood of having to pay ex post relief or recovery in the future does not appar-
ently provide any positive incentives to politicians to invest in disaster prevention 
mechanisms. Politicians receive little reward from ex ante disaster management 
policies, and therefore they may be undersupplied. The political reward for ex post 
compensation may, on the contrary, be very strong and, as a result, ex post relief is 
likely to be oversupplied (Depoorter 2006). In this respect, the situation with the 
newly installed ERDF is far more problematic. The ERDF does indeed go much 
further than merely providing immediate relief after the disaster and also aims at ex 
post reconstruction. The criticism formulated in the literature with respect to ex post 
recovery therefore fully applies to the newly created ERDF.
Empirical evidence shows that disaster expenditure is often politically motivated: 
in the U.S. those states that are politically important to the president have a higher 
rate of disaster declaration by the president, and disaster expenditure is higher in 
states having congressional representation on oversight committees of the U.S. Fed-
eral Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) (Gerrett and Sobel 2003). Politicians 
prefer concentrated benefits (for victims living in hazard-prone areas) and diffuse 
costs (to tax payers). That explains why there is often overinvestment in recovery 
after disasters, especially when there is extraordinary media coverage (Moss 2010).
This literature obviously has important consequences, also for the analysis of 
both the EUSF and the ERDF. In fact, just as there may be distorted incentives for 
domestic governments to grant ex post recovery to victims of natural disasters as 
well as for underinvestment by victims counting on ex post recovery, the same effect 
may equally occur in the relationship between the EUSF, ERDF and the domestic 
governments that may benefit from the payments. The general problem remains that 
governments, obviously also at the EU level, systematically underinvest in preven-
tion against disasters due to the lack of political reward. The major reason is due 
to time inconsistency: investments in prevention against future disasters may lead 
to costs to current tax payers, whereas benefits could only be provided to poten-
tial victims in a distant future. Politicians suffering from the NIMTOF syndrome46 
will therefore not benefit from investments in prevention that may only deliver ben-
efits to future voters. The fact that the EUSF and ERDF now make it possible for 
EU governments to call on this solidarity fund actually rewards their underinvest-
ment in prevention and therefore contributes precisely to the distorting effects of 
solidarity payment, just as in the case of charity hazards with victims of natural dis-
asters. Moreover, just as domestic governments have a tendency to oversupply ex 
post recovery because of the political rewards it provides (see already Hirshleifer 
1953), one can argue that the EUSF provides an excellent legitimising function for 
the European authorities to show their care and concern at the time of a disaster. In 
the end, both the EUSF and the recently created funding mechanism via the ERDF 
will be financed by the other EU Member States.
Looking at the history of the EUSF, it becomes clear that in practice it has been 
nothing less than a large redistribution mechanism. Of the grand total of EUSF aid 
approved since 2002 (EUR 5,242.29 million), approximately EUR 4 000 million 
46 NIMTOF: not in my term of office.
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was paid to only five EU Member States. Indeed, it is doubtful whether these types 
of direct solidarity payments to EU Member State governments are the most appro-
priate way of providing incentives for adequate investments in disaster risk reduc-
tion, especially as the data shows that some of the governments that most benefited 
from the EUSF are typically the larger EU Member States, such as Germany (EUR 
1002.9 million), Italy (EUR 2515.7 million), Austria (EUR 170.74 million), France 
(EUR 252.6 million) and the United Kingdom (EUR 222.6 million). However, this 
is not surprising, given that the larger Member States also pay larger contributions.47
Payments by the EUSF could be seen to provide distorted incentives—just as in 
the case of victims of natural disasters on the domestic level—whereas insurance 
has been argued to be a more appropriate incentive mechanism (see especially Kun-
reuther 1968). All the problematic aspects of this EUSF are in fact re-enforced in the 
ERDF, since that provides even more generous compensation (up to 95%) and also 
pays for reconstruction.
If particular EU Member States really encountered immediate financing problems 
in times of natural disaster, an obvious alternative would be to consider sovereign 
insurance. The World Bank has examined the possibility of sovereign natural disas-
ter insurance—especially for developing countries—to solve the short-term liquidity 
need (for Ghesquiere and Mahul 2007). Whereas insurance (via risk differentiation) 
always provides incentives for disaster risk reduction (see Priest 1996), uncondi-
tional solidarity payments do not.
Summary
To sum up, European solidarity funds could learn a lot from the literature on soli-
darity payments by domestic governments to victims of disasters. An important part 
of that literature, criticising ex post recovery and pointing to the distorted incentives 
of politicians to underinvest in prevention and overinvest in recovery, may to some 
extent play an important role with respect to these European solidarity funds as well.
Conclusion
The main question that we wanted to examine in this article was whether there is 
any particular task for the European Union with respect to compensation for vic-
tims of disasters, in particular in disaster insurance. In addition, we distinguished 
between two possible approaches: one in which the role of the EU would be lim-
ited to facilitating the insurability of natural disasters and another in which the 
EU would provide ex post compensation to states.
We used the economic literature with respect to federalism to analyse the 
optimal division of labour between the Member States and the EU level. The 
47 See the data on the factsheet of the EU Solidarity Fund on their website, providing an overview of EU 
Solidarity Fund interventions since 2002. https ://ec.europ a.eu/regio nal_polic y/sourc es/thefu nds/doc/inter 
venti ons_since _2002.pdf.
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literature has paid some attention to the related problem of adaptation to cli-
mate change where disaster insurance, more particularly for flooding, also plays 
an important role. The literature, or more specifically the models of democratic 
experimentalism and collaborative governance, call for hybrid solutions of col-
laboration between central authorities and local authorities with a view to optimal 
decision-making within a multi-level governance framework. This can be recog-
nised in the domain of climate change adaptation and disaster insurance, as many 
adaptation measures should of course be taken at the local level, but a broader 
framework could be (and has been) developed at the EU level.
Applying these theoretical insights to the question of which particular form the 
role of the EU should take with respect to compensating disasters, a case can be 
made for limiting the role of the EU to facilitating insurability. There are, how-
ever, fewer reasons to expand this role to provide ex post compensation to states. 
Current EU policy only partially corresponds to these recommendations. There 
seems to be a willingness to stimulate the insurability of natural hazards and a 
general reluctance to move EU intervention further into that specific area, for 
example by harmonising insurance. That tendency is in line with the theoretical 
insights. However, even though the theoretical framework does not provide clear 
justifications for an EU role in providing ex post compensation to states, this is 
actually taking place via the EUSF and the ERDF, as we discussed in the section 
“European initiatives …” These compensation funds were created by the EU to 
show solidarity with the victims of disasters.
We argued that we could learn a lot from the literature related to solidarity 
payments by domestic governments to victims of disasters. An important part of 
that literature, criticising ex post recovery and pointing to the distorted incen-
tives of politicians to underinvest in prevention and overinvest in recovery may 
to some extent play an important role in these European compensation funds as 
well. These payments may potentially have serious adverse effects, more par-
ticularly related to the fact that Member States themselves might not invest suf-
ficiently in preventive measures.
So, coming back to our question of what the task of the European Union 
should be with respect to compensation for victims of disaster, we argue that the 
European Union could rather play a facilitative role by providing information or 
by acting as an insurer of last resort in order to stimulate insurability. There are, 
however, fewer arguments in favour of the EU providing ex post compensation 
to states. Not only is there no strong theoretical justification, but the literature 
equally points to the potentially adverse effects of those ex post compensation 
mechanisms and, more particularly, a negative effect on the incentives to invest in 
disaster risk reduction.
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